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Spiritual and Bodily Freedom 
Christian Liberty in Early Modern Reformed Theology* 
Henk van den Belt 
Professor of Reformed Theology, Faculty of Theology 
and Religious Studies, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
h.van.den.belt@rug.nl 
Abstract 
The notion of Christian liberty is essential for the understanding of the Reformed concept 
of the law. Early modern protestant theology, however, made a sharp distinction 
between spiritual and bodily liberty. This distinction originated from Luther’s concept 
of the two kingdoms. It enabled John Calvin to criticize the church for binding the consciences 
and at the same time appeal to the civil government for reform of the church. 
Because of the reshuffling of the Institutes in 1559 this function of Christian liberty is 
easily lost out of sight. In the further development of Reformed theology the distinction 
between spiritual and bodily liberty was applied to the Christian life of individual 
believers, as the examples of William Perkins and the Leiden Synopsis of Purer Theology 
show. Thus the reforming power of the distinction was lost and it was used to confirm 
the political and social status quo instead. 
Keywords 
John Calvin – Institutes – William Perkins – Synopsis of Purer Theology – Spiritual 
liberty – Bodily liberty – Hungarian students in the Netherlands 
* A draft of this article was presented at the 10th irti Conference ‘Calvinism and Law’ in 
Sárospatak, July 2–7, 2013. 
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Introduction 
On October 20, 1627 the Hungarian student Stephanus N. Keczkemetinus 
(István from Kecskemét), one of the many Hungarian students at Leiden University, 
defended seventeen theses on De Libertate Christiana in the first repetition 
of the series of disputations that had led to the famous Leiden handbook 
of Reformed systematic theology, the Synopsis Purioris Theologiae.1 These separate 
disputations were mostly not collected by the university libraries and many 
of them are lost. Thanks to foreign students who collected the disputations and 
bound them, we can compare the texts of the repetitions with that of Synopsis 
itself. One of the other Hungarian students in Leiden, Ioannes Matko Lascovius 
(Laskai Matkó János), collected almost a complete series, partly of the first and 
partly of the second repetition.2 
In one of his theses Keczkemetinus says “There are two kinds of servitude: 
corporeal or civil and spiritual. It is not the place here to deal with the first or 
with its opposite [corporeal or civil] liberty, but with the second.”3 This Leiden 
disputation gives a fine discussion of spiritual liberty but does not deal with 
the relationship between Christian freedom and the magistrate or politics. This 
is remarkable given the original connection between the two topics in John 
Calvin’s first edition of the Institutes. The main question for this article is where 
the tendency in Reformed theology to reserve Christian liberty for the spiritual 
realm comes from and how it developed. This question will be answered from 
the subsequent editions of John Calvin’s Institutes, from William Perkin’s Cases 
of Conscience and from the Leiden Synopsis Purioris Theologiae. The article ends 
with a short evaluation and some remarks about the theological consequences 
of this development. 
1 Andreas Rivetus, Disputationum theologicarum repetitarum trigesima-quinta, De libertate 
christiana, Stephanus N. Keczkemetinus respondent (Leiden: Elzevir, 1627). Together with all 
the disputations from the first repetitio, the disputation On Christian Liberty is owned by the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. On the Synopsis and its repetitions see Donald Sinnema and Henk 
van den Belt, “The Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (1625) as a Disputation Cycle,” Church History 
and Religious Culture 92 (2012), 503–537. 
2 The collection is owned by Debrecen Reformed Theological University Library and labeled 
‘Egbekötve: rmk1181–1196.’ The cover of the bound collection originally had the supralibros 
i.m.l. I thank Róbert Oláh from the Debrecen library for helping me discovering the original 
owner. 
3 Rivetus and Keczkemetinus, De libertate christiana, thesis 1. 
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John Calvin’s Institutes 
In the original edition of Calvin’s Institutes (1536) the title of the sixth chapter 
was De libertate christiana, potestate ecclesiastica, et politica adiministratione.4 
In this catechetical and apologetic work Calvin thus connected Christian freedom 
both with the power of the church and with the civil government. 
In the second edition of the Institutes (1539) Calvin splits this final chapter 
into the chapters fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen and adds a seventeenth chapter 
De vita christiana, in which he describes Christian life as a pilgrimage, characterized 
by the meditation on the future life. This chapter serves as the conclusion 
of the Institutes from the second to the fourth editions. In these editions 
the chapters on the power of the church and of the magistrate are sandwiched 
by Christian freedom and eschatological spirituality. 
In the final edition of the Institutes (1559) Calvin entirely reshuffles this 
material; the chapter on Christian liberty is placed after justification, the one on 
the ecclesiastical power is spread throughout the fourth book of the Institutes, 
and the chapter on the life of a Christian is placed after regeneration by faith. 
Just like the first edition, the final edition of the Institutes ends with the chapter 
on the political administration, now as part of the fourth book on the external 
means of grace. Calvin copies the text on Christian liberty from the first edition 
in all the following editions, only adding a few sentences or a short paragraph 
here and there. While the text remains largely the same, the context changes, 
especially in the final edition. 
Freedom Consists of Three Parts 
The shifts in the structure of the Institutes have consequences for the relationship 
between Christian liberty and politics. In 1536 Calvin opens the discussion 
of Christian liberty by stressing its importance for the conscience that will otherwise 
“dare undertake almost nothing without faltering […] unless this freedom 
be grasped, neither Christ nor gospel truth, [1559: nor inner peace of soul] 
is rightly known.”5 
4 P. Barth and G. Niesel (eds), Joannis Calvini opera selecta (Munich: Kaiser, 1926–1936) [henceforth 
os] 1:223. 
5 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion: 1536 Edition, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 176. All direct quotes from the 1536 edition are from this translation. 
Cf. John Calvin, Institutes (1559) 3.19.1. All direct quotes from the 1559 edition are from John 
T. McNeil (ed), Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, transl. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), the following references only will mention the paragraph 
number. A reference to os is only added if the Latin is important. 
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According to Calvin, Christian freedom consists of three parts. The first is 
that the consciences of believers forget all law-righteousness for their justification. 
We should turn away from ourselves, and look only to Christ.6 The second 
part of Christian liberty is that believers willingly obey the law, exactly because 
they are freed from it as a yoke. If you look at the law even the best works are 
incomplete and damnable, but the surprise of Christian liberty is that God calls 
us to obedience with fatherly gentleness and therefore we serve him not like 
servants, but like sons obey their fathers who “do not hesitate to offer them 
incomplete and half-done and even defective works, trusting that their obedience 
and readiness of mind will be accepted.”7 The third part of Christian 
freedom regards the adiaphora, the things that we freely can use or refuse. The 
knowledge of this point is very important lest our consciences become restless 
and ensnared in superstitions as in a maze. “If a man begins to doubt whether 
he may use linen for sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs, and napkins, he will afterward 
be uncertain also about hemp; finally, doubt will even arise over tow.”8 
We should appreciate all God’s gifts and use them for the purpose they were 
given to us, without scruple of conscience or trouble of mind. 
How does the distinction between the spiritual and carnal liberty function 
in 1536? According to Calvin, Christian freedom is spiritual and therefore there 
is no reason to abuse God’s good gifts for one’s own pleasure or with disregard 
of weaker Christians; Calvin advocates moderation and charity. The emphasis 
on the spiritual character of Christian liberty is first and foremost a correction 
of the abuse of liberty; spiritual liberty stands over against carnal liberty. 
But the emphasis on the spiritual nature of liberty also serves a second 
goal. Because Christian freedom is spiritual it pertains to the spiritual realm, 
to the life of the Christian before the face of God. He or she is bound to the 
Word, but not to human traditions and commandments. This implies that one 
cannot appeal to Christian liberty for political revolution. Calvin writes that the 
consciences of believers are not bound to human authority in those things in 
which God wants them to be free, but he adds that “huge troubles are stirred 
up, partly by the seditious, partly by slanderers as if all human obedience were 
at the same time removed and cast down.”9 
The seditious, of course, are the revolutionary Anabaptists and the slanderers 
are the papal theologians who called all advocates of evangelical reform 
6 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 176–177. Cf. Institutes 3.19.2. 
7 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 178. Cf. Institutes 3.19.5. 
8 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 179. Cf. Institutes 3.19.7. 
9 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 183–184. Cf. Institutes 3.19.14. 
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revolutionary. Calvin criticizes the usurping power of the church over the consciences, 
but confirms the political power of the magistrate, by stressing that 
Christian liberty is spiritual. Thus spiritual liberty is not only opposed to carnal, 
but also to political liberty. 
A Two-Fold Regiment 
Following Luther’s distinction of the two kingdoms, Calvin discerns a twofold 
government, a duplex regimen: “in man: one side is spiritual, whereby the 
conscience is instructed in piety and in reverencing God; the other side is 
political, whereby man is educated for the duties of humanity and citizenship 
that must be maintained among men.”10 These two governments are usually 
called the jurisdictio spiritualis et temporalis. Calvin uses the nouns regimen 
and regnum interchangeably and places the political and temporal ordo over 
against the spiritual realm. The former is located in the inner mind (interior 
animus), while the latter regulates outward behavior (externi mores). There are 
“two worlds, over which different kings and different laws have authority.”11 
In the first edition of the Institutes Calvin mainly uses Christian freedom to 
underline the priority and exclusive authority of the Word in the church and 
to refute the claim that any human institution or tradition can be binding for 
the conscience. Christian freedom pertains to the spiritual regnum. Calvin does 
not object to the political order, but to those who usurp power in the church 
and act as butchers instead of pastors. Ecclesiastical power is given for building 
up the church and should either be completely governed by the Word of God 
or relativized as a merely external regulation for church practice. 
The spiritual power of the pope is tyrannically opposed to God’s Word. 
Calvin rejects new doctrines that turn people away from the purity of God’s 
Word and new laws that trouble unhappy consciences; the whole so-called 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction (iurisdictio pseudo-ecclesiastica). “For if we allow 
Christ to rule among us, this whole kind of dominion is easily overturned and 
laid low.”12 
10 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 184. Cf. Institutes 3.19.15. This connection between Christian liberty 
and political theory is often overlooked. William R. Stevenson, however, states that 
Calvin’s emphasis on the rule of God through political and social institutions corrects and 
amends a revolutionary concept of liberty. William R. Stevenson, Jr., Sovereign Grace: The 
Place and Significance of Christian Freedom in John Calvin’s Political Thought (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 45–46. 
11 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 184, os 1:232. Cf. Institutes 3.19.15, os 4:249. 
12 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 200, os 1:250. Cf. Institutes 4.11.8, os 5:203. 
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The duplex regimen is important for the further development of Calvin’s 
thought. In 1543 he adds that this distinction prevents the misapplication of 
spiritual freedom to the political realm. One should not conclude that Christians 
are less subject to outward government and human laws, because their 
consciences are free. They are not “released from all bodily servitude because 
they are free according to the spirit.”13 
In 1550 he adds that the issue is so difficult because many do not distinguish 
sharply enough between the forum externum and the forum conscientiae.14 
What makes the matter more complicated is the fact that Paul writes in Romans 
13 that the magistrate should be obeyed not only out of fear for punishment, 
but for conscience’ sake. Whereas Calvin wants to restrict the freedom of 
conscience to the spiritual realm to correct misuse of church power, Paul 
seemingly says that political laws are binding for the conscience. It can easily 
be concluded that if the state can bind the conscience, the church can certainly 
do the same. This is how some Roman Catholic theologians argued. 
To solve the problem Calvin stresses in the final edition that the conscience 
has respect to God alone, even if it is sometimes extended to human relationships: 
a good conscience is the inward integrity of heart. A Christian can be 
bound by love for his weaker brother to abstain from meat, but “he still does 
not cease to keep freedom of conscience. We see how this law, while binding 
outward actions, leaves the conscience free.”15 
Christian Freedom Relativizes the Political Order 
The final paragraph of the 1536-Institutes states that Christian liberty does 
not extend to the political realm. Calvin wants to convince the French magistrates— 
and in the first place king Francis i to whom the work was dedicated— 
that the evangelicals in the French Catholic Church differ from the revolutionary 
Anabaptists. The claim that Christian liberty is spiritual and does not apply 
to politics thus functions as a disclaimer. The French evangelicals are no radicals. 
By placing politics in the context of Christian liberty Calvin relativizes the 
political ordo. The relativizing influence of Christian freedom appears in the 
first place, when Calvin underlines that the magistrate can only bind the body 
and not the soul, only the outward human being and not the conscience. The 
distinction corrects those who conclude from Christian freedom that they don’t 
13 Calvin, Institutes 3.19.15, os 4:294. 
14 Calvin, Institutes 3.19.15, os 4:295. 
15 Calvin, Institutes 3.19.16. 
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have to acknowledge any king or magistrate, but only the authority of Christ. 
“But whoever knows how to distinguish between body and soul, between this 
present fleeting life and that future eternal life, will without difficulty know 
that Christ’s spiritual Kingdom and the civil jurisdiction are things completely 
distinct.”16 
Secondly, the magistrate is only necessary because and as long as the kingdom 
of God has not yet fully come. Rome claims that the church is perfect and 
that its rules have the status of divine law. Calvin says that exactly because 
the church is not yet the kingdom of God, a civil magistrate is necessary ad 
interim. Therefore the spiritual kingdom of Christ is not opposed to the civil 
government, but only distinct from it. The heavenly kingdom of Christ has 
already begun on earth and this beginning forecasts immortal and incorruptible 
blessedness. As long as all remains imperfect the civil government has as its 
goal “to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social behavior to civil 
righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to promote general peace 
and tranquility.”17 In 1559 Calvin adds before the other goals, that the government 
has “to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound 
doctrine of piety and the position of the church.”18 
The kingdom of God does not wipe out the present life. While we travel 
as pilgrims on earth to the heavenly fatherland, we need some help on our 
pilgrimage. Without a government, true humanitas would be endangered. The 
magistrate serves to restrain sin in this world and, more important for Calvin, 
corrects the power claims of the Roman Church. 
Calvin replaces an omnipotent church that rules over the consciences by 
inventing additional laws, with a magistrate that creates and defends the public 
sphere in such a way that the church can be reformed and flourish. Exactly 
because the church is spiritual it is not allowed to bind the conscience in externals. 
Exactly because the magistrate is external it is called to guard external 
space for true religion, although it can never bind the consciences. 
Let no man be disturbed that I now commit to civil government the duty 
of rightly establishing religion, which I seem above to have put outside of 
human decision. For, when I approve of a civil administration that aims 
16 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 207. Cf. Institutes 4.20.1. 
17 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 208. Cf. Institutes 4.20.3. 
18 Calvin, Institutes 4.20.3. On the development of this part of the Institutes cf. H. van den Belt, 
‘The Exegetical Background of Calvin’s View of the Government.’ In: H. van den Belt (ed.), 
Restoration through Redemption: John Calvin Revisited [Studies in Reformed Theology, 23] 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 83–94. 
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to prevent the true religion which is contained in God’s law from being 
openly and with public sacrilege violated and defiled with impunity, I do 
not here, any more than before, allow men to make laws according to their 
own decision concerning religion and the worship of God.19 
Finally, the relativizing influence of Christian freedom can also be seen in those 
parts of Calvin’s political theory in which he discusses divergent practical political 
situaltions: It is the divine calling of the magistrates to govern the people, 
but the form—monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—is less important. The 
people always have to obey the magistrates, even if they misuse their authority, 
but lower magistrates must withstand the licentiousness of kings. Above and, if 
necessary, even against human authority, everyone has to obey God “to whose 
will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands 
ought to yield, to whose majesty their scepters ought to be submitted.”20 
All of these relativizing consequences of Christian freedom are retained in 
the final text of the Institutes, but due to the reshuffling of the Institutes and 
to a growing emphasis on the authority of the civil government in external 
religious affairs, the original relativizing power of Christian liberty for the 
specific political order is no longer very clear. 
The distinction of a spiritual and eternal from a political and temporal 
sphere also remains throughout the editions of the Institutes, but the original 
argument that Christian liberty implies that the church should be reformed 
by refraining from binding the conscience externally and by binding the conscience 
only inwardly to the Word of God and that the magistrate should create 
the external benchmarks for the reform of the church without violating the 
conscience, can only be found by reconstructing the text. 
Calvin was happy with the final structure of the Institutes, but the reshuffling 
of the material makes it difficult to see the original connection between 
his view of Christian liberty and his political theory. Although the political paragraph 
in the final edition is only loosely connected to the chapter on the church 
and the sacraments, one might easily conclude that the magistrate is one of the 
external means of grace and thus overemphasize its role, especially because 
the political paragraphs are no longer sandwiched by the chapters on Christian 
liberty and the meditation on the future life. In 1559 Calvin adds that the 
topic might seem alien to the spiritualis doctrina of faith.21 Perhaps he felt that 
19 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 208–209. Cf. Institutes 4.20.3. 
20 Calvin, Institutes 1536, 225. Cf. Institutes 4.20.32. 
21 Calvin, Institutes 4.20.1, os 5:471. 
 
  
156 van den belt 
Journal of Reformed Theology 9 (2015) 148–165 
 
in the new structure it seems to come out of the blue after the doctrine of the 
sacraments, but Calvin possibly also sensed that the original connection with 
Christian liberty was no longer clear. 
William Perkins 
The further development of Reformed theology disconnected the concept of 
Christian liberty from both the reformation of the church and the responsibility 
of the civil government, individualizing and spiritualizing the concept 
more and more. Two examples suffice to illustrate this development. In 1596 
William Perkins (1558–1602) wrote a treatise, titled A Discourse of Conscience. 
He defined Christian liberty as 
a spirituall and holy freedome purchased by Christ. I say it is spiritual, 
first to put a difference betweene it and civill libertie, which standes in 
outward and bodily freedomes and priviledges, secondly to confute the 
Iewes, that looke for earthly libertie by Christ: and the Anabaptists, who 
imagine a freedome from all authoritie of Magistrates in the kingdome of 
Christ.22 
Whereas Calvin used the concept of Christian liberty as a reforming force for 
both church and magistrate, Perkins develops the distinction between the two 
realms into a division. Christian liberty is so spiritual that it not only excludes 
revolution, as Calvin also stated, but has no political or social consequences at 
all. With Calvin, Perkins distinguishes three parts of Christian liberty. 
The first is a freedome from the iustification of the morall law. […] The 
second part, is freedome from the rigour of the lawe, which exacteth 
perfect obedience and condemneth all imperfection. […] The third part 
is, that the conscience is freed from the bond of the ceremoniall law. 
[…] Hence it followeth that all Christians may freely without scruple of 
conscience use all things indifferent, so be it the manner of using them 
be good.23 
22 William Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’ in William Perkins, Works ([Cambridge]: 
John Legate, 1600), 813–909, 868. The original publication was William Perkins, A Discourse 
of Conscience (Cambridge, John Legate, 1596). 
23 Perkins, Works, 868–869. 
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Perkins distinguishes between a natural and a spiritual use of Christian 
liberty. He, however, does not apply it to the church and the magistrate, but 
to the natural and spiritual life of individual believers. The natural use is for 
the things we need or may use, such as drinking wine and enjoying the infinite 
varieties of colors, savors, tastes, and forms in creation. Exercises and sports 
refresh the body and the mind but their use is restricted must be used sparingly 
and moderately. Not everything is lawful, dancing for instance is forbidden, 
because “what account can bee given of these paces backward & forward, 
of caprings, iumps, gambols, turnings, with many other frisks of lightnes and 
vanitie, more beseeming goates and apes, of whome they are commonly used, 
then men.”24 
The spiritual use of Christian liberty applies when we meditate on the 
creatures and make spiritual applications from natural things, for instance on 
seeing a vine and branches think of the union between Christ and the church 
and or seeing a rainbow think of the promise of God not to drown the world 
again. 
The only place where the connection to civil authority reappears, is when 
Perkins says indifferent things “after the law is once made of them, remaine 
still indifferent in themselues: yet obedience to the law is neccessary, and that 
for conscience sake.”25 In other words, things not in themselves binding for the 
individual conscience can become binding because Christians have to obey the 
civil government. 
Of course, this is only a partial picture of Perkins thought on the subject, 
but the change with regard to Christian liberty is clear, the application is 
spiritualized and personalized and the reforming force for both church and 
state has disappeared. 
Synopsis Purioris Theologiae 
The Leiden Synopsis Purioris Theologiae was originally published as a cycle of 
52 disputations defended under four Leiden professors: Johannes Polyander 
(1568–1646), Andreas Rivetus (1572–1651), Antonius Thysius (1565–1640), and 
Anthonius Walaeus (1573–1639).26 The Synopsis was written after the synod of 
24 Perkins, Works, 869. 
25 Perkins, Works, 871. 
26 Johannes Polyander, Andreas Rivetus, Antonius Walaeus, and Antonius Thysius, Synopsis 
purioris theologiae, disputationibus quinquaginta duabus comprehensa ac conscripta, 
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Dort and claims to phrase the Reformed orthodox faith as it was purified from 
the errors of Arminianism, hence the Synopsis of Purer Theology. Its intention 
was to summarize the Reformed position in positive statements for theological 
students. 
The thirty-fifth disputation—and consequently the corresponding chapter 
of the book—deals with Christian liberty. After the book was published in 1625, 
the professors decided to repeat the series for a few times with disputations on 
the same subjects, but with a different text and thus the Hungarian student 
István from Kecskemét, cited above, defended his theses in the thirty-fifth 
disputation of the first repetitio in 1627. 
Distinction between Spiritual and Political Freedom 
The disputation De Libertate Christiana, defended in 1622 by Jacobus Henricus 
under the presidency of Andreas Rivetus, consists of 49 theses.27 It opens by 
placing the subject in its proper context. The preceding disputations deal with 
redemption and its application by faith 
for all who through Christ’s merit have been redeemed from slavery to sin 
and death; and also the sanctification of those who have been justified 
and their thankfulness in the exercise of good works. In fitting order, 
therefore, it follows that we now undertake an investigation into the true 
Christian, or evangelical, freedom that is shared by all who have received 
the fruits of Christ’s suffering.28 
This libertas Christiana or evangelica is so important that if it is not held 
correctly one is unable to know Christ, the Gospel, and inward peace in the 
souls in the right way.29 The disputation contrasts libertas and servitus. Slavery 
(Leiden: Elzevir, 1625). The Leiden Synopsis was reprinted in the nineteenth century. 
H. Bavinck (ed.), Synopsis purioris theologiae (Leiden: D. Donner, 1881). At present the 
Research Group Classic Reformed Theology is working on a critical edition of which the 
first volume has been published. Dolf te Velde, Willem J. van Asselt, William den Boer 
(eds.) Riemer A. Faber (trans.), Synopsis purioris theologiae, Synopsis of a Purer Theology: 
Latin Text and English Translation, vol. 1, (Leiden: Brill, 2014). The disputation on Christian 
Liberty will be published in volume 2. 
27 Andreas Rivetus, Disputationum theologicarum trigesima-quinta, De libertate Christiana, 
Jacobus Henricus respondent, (Leiden: Elzevir, 1622). Cf, Bavinck, Synopsis 357–372. 
28 spt 35.1. Bavinck, Synopsis, 357. The translation is from Riemer Faber. 
29 spt 35.2. Bavinck, Synopsis, 357. Without mentioning Calvin, the Synopsis copies the 
phrase from the Institutes 3.19.1. 
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is a state of subjection, either voluntary or forced and so men are divided 
into slaves, freemen, and freedmen or liberated slaves. Slaves are “under the 
power of another person either by the right of war, by birth, by just sentence of 
condemnation, by purchase, or by legal determination.”30 Words and phrases 
from civic and corporal slavery and liberty can be used to explain their spiritual 
counterparts, but the author is very clear to state that the disputation is not 
“dealing here with the question of that civic and corporal slavery, nor with its 
opposite, civic and corporal freedom.”31 
After Adam abused his natural freedom he and we lost it and became slaves 
to sin and Satan and subject to vanity and misery. Accordingly there is a 
threefold liberty: that of nature as Adam enjoyed, that of grace—the liberty 
of believers in this life—and that of glory, the liberty whereby believers will 
once be freed from all misery. Christian freedom is of the second sort, libertas 
gratiae. The Synopsis defines Christian liberty as 
the condition of people who have been set free by the grace of Christ, a 
condition whereby their consciences have been released from slavery to 
sin, the tyranny of the Devil, and from the precise demands and curse of 
the moral law, and from observing the ceremonial law; and the yoke of 
human traditions having been shaken off, they safely conduct intermediate 
things without reproach by applying knowledge of faith and practical 
judgment of love, so that they who have not received ‘a spirit of slavery 
unto fear’ but a spirit of sonship (Romans 8:15) may serve God willingly 
and eagerly in soul and in body, ‘for the praise of his glorious grace’ [Ephesians 
1:6] and their own eternal salvation.32 
In its discussion of the material cause of Christian liberty33 the disputation 
first deals with liberty from sin and its consequences. It rejects antinomianism; 
Christians are free from the law as a means for justification or as far as it 
condemns, but the law remains useful for them, because it teaches them in 
which good works they ought to walk. Christian liberty includes freedom of 
conscience regarding human traditions, because God has granted no-one the 
authority to bind someone else’s conscience. 
30 spt 35.3. Bavinck, Synopsis, 357. 
31 spt 35.4. Bavinck, Synopsis, 357–358. 
32 spt 35.7. Bavinck, Synopsis, 358–359. 
33 As is common in the Synopsis, the disputation first gives a clear definition of the theme 
and then elaborates on it following the lines of the Aristotelian distinction of the efficient, 
material, formal and final causes. 
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This claim leads to the distinction between the spiritual and the civil realms. 
“But since we are speaking about strictly spiritual government, which we claim 
belongs entirely to God alone […], we do not wish what we say about spiritual 
freedom to be wrongly drawn into the realm of politics. […] For we reject the 
fanatics who under the pretext of Christian freedom cast off every form of civil 
obedience.”34 
The Latin opposes the spiritual regimen and the political ordo. The first 
and second repetitions make the same or similar distinctions, the second 
repetition—the one in the Debrecen collection of Laskai Matkó János—refers 
to the example of Onesimus, who was loved as a brother and still a slave 
according to the flesh.35 
In the Synopsis this distinction is contrasted to the Roman Catholic position 
that—in the view of the Reformed orthodox—binds the consciences by 
political laws as much as by divine laws. Human laws can only be binding in a 
mediated way, because God commands obedience towards the magistrate. Bellarmine 
incorrectly teaches that “the civil law is no less binding than the divine 
law, and that all laws that have been made by any one at all (whether God, an 
angel, or a human being) are binding in the same manner”.36 
This refutation of the counter-Reformation is a residue from the original 
application of Christian freedom to ecclesiastical power by Calvin. He used the 
distinction between spiritual and political to deny the power of the church over 
the conscience and to maintain the power of the magistrate over the external 
life of the Christian. Bellarmine and other representatives of the Catholic Reformation 
maintained that the laws of the church and the magistrate were binding 
for the conscience, because Christians are called to obedience to all authorities 
in Romans 13 for instance. 
At the end of the disputation, the Synopsis repeats the main thrust of the 
distinction between the spiritual and the political freedom: 
34 spt 35.18. Bavinck, Synopsis, 362. 
35 Antonius Thysius, Disputationum theologicarum, quae ex ordine repeti consueverunt trigesima 
quinta, De libertate christiana, Rycmannus B. ten Bem Stephanus respondent (Leiden: 
Elzevir, 1631), thesis 11. 
36 spt 35.19. Bavinck, Synopsis, 362. The disputation paraphrases Bellarmine. Cf. Robertus 
Bellarminus, Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei adversus hujus temporis 
haereticos, Tertia Controversia Generalis de Sumo Pontifice, Liber Tertius, Controversiarum 
de Membris Ecclesiae, Caput xi (iii,iii,11). Cf. Robertus Bellarminus, Opera Omnia, 
Justinus Fèvre (ed.), (Paris: Louis Vives, 1870–1874), vol. 3, 17–18. 
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This freedom does not constitute exemption from all laws (both divine 
and human ones) and that it is not a license for living by the feelings of 
one’s heart and of indulging the sinful desires of the flesh, nor a release 
from civic responsibility, duties and payments. For there is nothing to 
prevent those who are free spiritually from serving with their bodies 
(1Corinthians 7:21); “servants obey your earthly masters, as to the Lord” 
(Ephesians 6:5). Therefore Christians are subject to their kings and magistrates, 
as before (Romans 13:1), and they seriously condemn all those 
who under the pretext of Christian freedom attempt to shake off the yoke 
of magistrates and who enslave themselves to the Devil by ‘turning their 
freedom into an opportunity for the flesh’ (Galatians 1:13).37 
Calvin already acknowledged that according to Romans 13 the Christian may 
be bound by outward laws or human ordinances, but the conscience as related 
to God still remained inwardly free. Perkins and the Synopsis, however, stress 
that things indifferent in themselves become binding because of obedience to 
the law or to the magistrate and that Christian liberty does not exclude bodily 
servitude and subjection to the civil government. 
Calvin relativized the power of church and magistrate by stressing spiritual 
Christian liberty, whereas later Reformed theologians confirm the power of the 
Reformed church and the magistrate by stressing that Christian liberty is so 
spiritual that it does not have any bodily or civil consequences. 
Hermeneutics 
The Synopsis-disputation also discusses the Old Testament legislation. The 
moral law, as summarized in the Ten Commandments, has a lasting value. 
Christian liberty implies that ceremonial laws are no longer binding for the 
consciences. Still their fulfillment in Christ does not take away their great value 
because they prefigure Christ. The judicial laws may contain some ceremonial 
elements, but the laws themselves are out of date, for example “the one about 
the corpse of someone who has been hanged, that it must be buried on the 
same day lest the land should be polluted.”38 Apparently that was difficult to 
apply to the seventeenth century situation, in which it was a matter of Christian 
liberty to be able to hang dead bodies of criminals in the open air for much 
longer than a day. 
37 spt 35.47. Bavinck, Synopsis, 370. 
38 spt 35.28. Bavinck, Synopsis, 368. 
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The distinction between the two kinds of laws or between the two aspects— 
the moral and binding and the circumstantial and not-binding—within the 
laws has to be made according to a certain norm. According to the Synopsis, 
the moral laws with a lasting value can be recognized from the universal principles 
of nature and common sense. These laws should not be kept because 
of the authority of Moses, but to the extent that they are “marked by law and 
common reason and pertain to the law of nature.”39 Apparently Christian freedom 
does not extend to those elements in the Old Testament legislation that 
correspond with the universal natural law. 
Thus, in a very restricted sense, general or natural revelation becomes the 
judge of special revelation, or at least the lens by which the distinction is made 
between lasting moral elements and mere juridical elements in the laws of the 
Old Testament. The criterion lies in the universal principles of nature, common 
sense, and human reason. 
The distinction is made in order to refute the rejection by the Anabaptists 
and other fanatics of all ancient Roman laws or other laws for Christian legislation 
and the plea of some of them to reintroduce Mosaic laws for contemporary 
civil cases. According to the Synopsis, this idea is “not only dangerous and confusing 
but also wrong and foolish.”40 
The discussion of the material cause of Christian liberty turns to the adiaphora, 
which are not good or bad in a moral sense. It is important to know 
this aspect of Christian liberty, because if people doubt about the will of God 
in these things, they easily “fall into all manner of superstitious ideas. In this 
way, once a scruple has befallen someone in the use of wool or linen, he will 
thereafter not be entirely sure about hemp, either.”41 
In the adiaphora, or middle things, a Christian on the one hand should 
not needlessly offend weaker brothers, but on the other hand also not give 
in to those who are superstitious. The freedom of conscience does not always 
have to be used by the Christian, because it concerns external things. By way 
of application the disputation turns to politics and defends the right of the 
magistrate or the church to regulate things that are indifferent in themselves. 
This does not bind the liberty itself, but only the outward use of it. 
39 spt 35.29. Bavinck, Synopsis, 368. 
40 spt 35.31. Bavinck, Synopsis, 366. 
41 spt 35.32. Bavinck, Synopsis, 368. The Latin for hemp is cannabis, but the early modern 
use, of course, was only external. The example stems from Calvin’s Institutes 3.19.7. 
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For strictly speaking it is only God who binds the consciences, […] and yet, 
on occasion a magistrate can, for the good of the nation, order or forbid 
something to be done that of itself is an intermediate thing (adiaphoron). 
And the church may decide something of a similar substance for the sake 
of good order—in such a way, however, that it does not assume for itself 
any power over the conscience.42 
The state or the church should not, however, abuse their rights nor transgress 
the boundaries of their jurisdiction. The subjects or church members are bound 
to obedience, but if the circumstances change or if necessity requires it, they 
are free to do otherwise. Of course, we should also not obey any authority that 
invents rules contrary to God’s Word or which do violence to the conscience. 
Still, Christian liberty 
does not constitute exemption from all laws (both divine and human 
ones) and it is not a license for living by the feelings of one’s heart and of 
indulging the sinful desires of the flesh, nor a release from civic responsibility, 
duties and payments. For there is nothing to prevent those who are 
free spiritually from serving with their bodies (1Corinthians 7:21).43 
Servants have to obey their masters, subjects serve their kings and it is wrong 
to revolt against the magistrates under the pretext of Christian freedom. In 
sum, as the disputation in the second repetition of the Synopsis—the one in 
the Debrecen collection—states: “We do not extend this spiritual liberty that 
is opposite to multiple [spiritual] slaveries, to the political realm.”44 
Conclusions 
John Calvin uses the distinction between spiritual and carnal or temporal 
liberty to argue that the church should refrain from binding the conscience 
externally. Christian freedom is spiritual and therefore the Reformation of the 
church does not imply revolution. Nevertheless, by placing politics in between 
Christian liberty and eschatological spirituality he relativizes the political 
order. The original connection of Christian liberty and Calvin’s concept of the 
42 spt 35.39. Bavinck, Synopsis, 368. 
43 spt 35.47. Bavinck, Synopsis, 370. 
44 Thysius and ten Bem, De libertate christiana, thesis 2. 
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magistrate relativizes the political order in three ways: a) the magistrate can 
only bind the outward human being and not the conscience, b) the magistrate 
is only necessary because the kingdom of God has not yet come, and c) there is 
no absolute human power, because every magistrate has to give an account to 
God and lower magistrates are called to protect the people against the abuses 
of higher magistrates. These elements are retained in the final text of the Institutes, 
but the connection with Christian liberty is easily lost out of sight because 
of the reshuffling of the text. Calvin’s original application of Christian liberty 
offered a limitation of ecclesiastical power as well as a legitimation of the civil 
government to reform the church. But this can only be found by returning to 
the earlier editions of the Institutes. 
From the place of the political paragraph in the final edition one might too 
easily conclude that the magistrate is one of the external means of grace and 
thus overemphasize its role, especially because the political paragraphs are no 
longer sandwiched by the chapters on Christian liberty and the meditation on 
the future life. 
The development of Reformed theology reveals a growing emphasis on 
the application of Christian liberty to the individual life of the believer, as 
the case of Perkins shows. The Synopsis does not restrict the application to 
the individual, but uses the distinction between spiritual liberty and bodily 
liberty mainly to distinguish between the ceremonial and moral parts of Old 
Testament legislation. Where Perkins and the Synopsis stress that Christian 
liberty does not extend to the political realm they enforce the power of the civil 
government, without copying the relativizing elements from Calvin’s Institutes, 
at least not in the context of Christian liberty. 
The statement that Christian liberty does not apply to the political sphere 
originated as a disclaimer against Anabaptist revolutionary ideas. In the development 
of Reformed theology however it became a legitimation of the political 
status quo. This development started with Calvin who restlessly corrected the 
Institutes isolating his chapter on the political administration from its original 
theological context in the final edition. 
The development was strengthened in the academic theology at the 
Reformed universities of the young European protestant states in the process of 
confessionalisation. The sovereignty of God over all things, in which the Christian 
liberty ultimately rests, places the earthly powers—both of the church and 
of the state—in their right position under God. It is easier to maintain this position 
from the perspective of a persecuted minority—the yough Calvin—than 
from that of a ruling majority. In a position of political power, the emphasis on 
the sovereignty of God too easily develops into a support for the status quo and 
the earthly powers. 
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For the right understanding of Christian liberty it is important to avoid a 
spiritualization and individualization of this fundamental part of Reformed 
theology, which has so many important implications both for hermeneutics 
and ethics. Reformed Christians should not give up applying Christian liberty 
to social and political issues. 
